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Abstract
This paper develops a mathematical model for cognitive performance of a tactical air
traffic controller in an en route air traffic control (ATC) context. The aim of this model-based
approach is to enable the evaluation of both accident risk and aspects like cognitive workload
and effectiveness of ATC in managing air traffic situations safely. Use is made of human
error modeling, Hollnagel’s cognitive mode model and Wickens multiple resources model.
The paper describes how these psychological sub-models are combined into a single model of
Air Traffic Controller (ATCo) cognitive performance, and how the interaction of these
human sub-models with the technical sub-systems is brought into account.
The model is applied to an exemplary air traffic management (ATM) scenario which
consists of two parallel lanes of opposite direction traffic at the same flight level, and where
the air traffic controller has no automation support tools like short-term conflict alert (STCA)
or Flight Path Monitoring. The obtained results for this conventional ATC situation are
compared to those previously obtained under the hypothetical assumption that a tactical air
traffic controller reacts to aircraft deviations in case of an STCA alert only.
I. Introduction
Over decades, the aviation industry has been able to compensate the increase in traffic
with a decrease in accident risk per flight hour. In view of the rapid growth of air traffic and
the technological and organizational complexity of it, this has been a major accomplishment.
Unfortunately, the point has been reached where it is unclear how to continue such
compensation. The reason is that in the past the decrease of risk per flight hour has come in
large part from technology-driven improvements of safety. The effect of this technology-
driven approach is shown through the accident statistics; they reveal that the relative share of
human-related causes is approximately 80%. This means that the historical air traffic safety
compensation process can be continued if one learns to understand how the human and
procedure-related accidents could be reduced. This should be accomplished by learning the
principles behind human-related accident causes in aviation.
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If we try to understand these principles on the basis of an evaluation of incidents and
accidents alone, then several difficulties arise. The number of incidents and accidents is
limited, whereas the situations that caused them are quite complex and reports are not free
from discussion. Due to the limited availability of data and the questionable validity of data,
statistical analysis alone is not sufficient to model safety in complex situations with multiple
human involvement. By now there is a broad consensus that appropriate safety models are
needed to understand the mechanisms behind the remaining accident risk in relation to
separation criteria and near-misses [1]. It is also recognized that such a safety modeling
approach should be useful in optimizing advanced air traffic management (ATM) operations
[2], [3], [4].
Most existing studies on ATM safety either focus on hazard analysis techniques or on
collision risk analysis. Studies with thorough hazard analysis results generally use simplified
collision risk models, advanced studies on collision risk between aircraft usually do not take
into account hazards or non-nominal events (except in adapted tails of probability density
functions). It appears that most established techniques fall short in integrating hazard analysis
techniques with advanced collision risk analysis techniques. In a series of studies, at the
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, this problem has been addressed with the development
of an accident risk assessment methodology and supporting evaluation tool set [both named
Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer  (TOPAZ)] that takes an integral approach
toward ATM safety assessment [5]. Recently it has also been shown how this approach
effectively supports safety management and the building of modern safety cases for advanced
operations in ATM [6].
At the basis of this accident risk assessment approach lies the use of a very general class
of mathematical models for describing the ATM process. The models used are hybrid state
Markov processes, which describe stochastic evolution of both continuous and discrete
variables over time. This means that both aircraft three-dimensional position and velocity and
operator states can be described as a function of time, including their interactions and the
effects of probabilistic disturbances. To accomplish this, existing and newly developed
models, such as generalized Reich collision risk model [7] and high-level Petri Net model [8],
[9], were combined in order to model and evaluate ATM operations on safety.
In parallel with its development, the methodology is applied to a variety of accident risk
assessment studies, e.g., converging runways [10], free flight equipped aircraft [11], [12], and
wake vortex induced accident risk [13]. Another type of application considered is
conventional en route traffic in a scenario of two parallel opposite direction lanes. In Ref.
[14], for this scenario, risk has been evaluated under two operational concepts. In the first
concept, named “No ATC” there is no air traffic control (ATC) surveillance of the traffic at
all; in the second concept, named “STCA-only based ATC”, the tactical air traffic controller
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sends deviating aircraft back to their lane if and only if there has been a short-term conflict
alert (STCA). Although the demonstrated possibility to obtain accident risk results for such
complex operations as ATM is quite promising in itself, several operational experts pointed
out that an STCA-only based ATC concept is overly conservative as a representation of
conventional ATM concepts, because routine monitoring and anticipation is not incorporated.
Therefore, the follow-up was to develop an appropriate human performance model for risk
assessments of such routine monitoring situations.
A crucial issue in ATM safety assessment is how the human factor is incorporated into
the risk model. Hence, there is a clear need for a modeling approach to assess and understand
accident risk in relation to the performance of the human operators involved. This means that
appropriate human performance models are required that describe human cognitive and
responsibility principles up to the level of accident risk. This paper aims to present the
developments of such a human cognition/performance model for a tactical controller within
the context of conventional en route ATC, and is based on a series of studies [15], [16], [17],
[18], [19].
At present, the view on human reliability has shifted from a context-free error centred
approach, in which unreliability is modeled as failures of human information processing,
toward a contextual perspective in which human actions are the product of human internal
states, strategies and the environment, [20], [21], [22]. From this viewpoint, safety critical
human actions should be modeled  in their relation to the other activities of the operator and
the environment. Thus for a proper description of human reliability, it is necessary to include
the cognitive processes that underlie the operator actions. As a result, one obtains a
comprehensive model of the operator performing his job.
The main benefits expected from contextual models for safety assessment are that they
provide better feedback to designers and that they remove the need to use overly conservative
individual submodels of relevant operator actions that may complicate understanding of how
safety is achieved in aviation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the background of three
complementary psychological models on which human cognitive performance modeling in
this paper is based. In Section III we explain how these three psychological models are jointly
used in a mathematical human cognition/performance model for a tactical en route controller.
This is largely done on the basis of human factors ATC expertise. Next, in Section IV this
mathematical model is reduced to a simpler model on the basis of clearly defined model
aggregation steps. In Section V, the reduced human cognition/performance model is used to
evaluate a conventional en route ATC situation with respect to accident risk and air traffic
controller actions. Finally, in Section VI we discuss the results obtained.
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II. Human Modeling Approaches
The mathematical human performance/reliability model development in this paper is
based on the following three complementary psychological models:
1. multiple resources model,
2. contextual control mode model, and
3. human error modeling.
In this section, we outline these three psychological models. One should be aware that
several other psychological human error type of models exist that have potential application
in ATM (see e.g., Ref.[23]).
A.  Multiple Resources Model
The main reference used here is Ref. [24]. The multiple resource model reflects the idea
that humans have several different mental capacities with resource properties. In this view,
task interference depends on the extent to which tasks use the same resources: two difficult
tasks may be time-shared easily if they use different types of resources. The multiple
resources approach has been well developed both for military applications [25] and for ATM
(e.g., Refs. [26], [27]). The principal idea behind the model is that human cognitive effort can
be divided over several activities. This is called the resources metaphor, [28]. Because
human cognitive effort is limited, the resources metaphor may readily account for failures in
time-sharing between competing activities. The underlying assumption of the resources
metaphor is that the human is an information processing system with limited processing
capacity. The model focuses on how this limited processing capacity can be used to time-
share several processing tasks.
When two or more tasks are to be successfully time-shared, the first important aspects are
the efficient scheduling and switching between activities. If sufficient time is available, the
operator can occupy himself with one task at a time, although this does not necessarily mean
that the tasks are performed sequentially. However, if the available time is not sufficient to
apply this strategy, concurrent task performance becomes necessary. With respect to
concurrent task performance, Wickens mentions three performance influencing task
characteristics:
1. Confusion. When an element of one task is similar to an element of a concurrently
performed other task, the elements may become confused, leading to a decrease in
performance.
2. Cooperation. In some cases, the similarity between performance routines for elements of
two tasks leads to cooperation between the routines. It is even possible that the two task
elements can be merged into one new task.
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3. Difficulty. The task difficulty highly influences whether a second task can be performed
concurrently.
The confusion and cooperation aspects are closely related: both emerge from the
similarity between tasks. However, cooperation is associated with similar processing
routines, whereas confusion emerges from similar input material. It will appear that by taking
into account the confusion and cooperation aspects of concurrent task performance leads to
multiple resources dimensions.
On the basis of a large number of dual-task studies, Wickens proposes a three
dimensional resource quantity, with dichotomous dimensions. The dimensions are:
1. Information processing stages. Dimension with early and central processing on the one
extreme (sensory processing, encoding and perception of stimuli) and late processing on
the other (deciding on the best response and its execution). For example, the requirement
for an air traffic controller to give a response to each change in aircraft state (late
processing) is predicted not to disrupt the ability to maintain an accurate mental model of
the radar display (early processing).
2. Modalities. Input modalities differentiate between the encoding of auditory and visually
presented stimuli. It is easier to divide attention between the eye and ear than between
two auditory or two visual stimuli. Response modes refer to the choice between a vocal
and a manual response. The reason that manual and vocal outputs can be efficiently time-
shared is probably due to the separation of spatial and verbal information processing
resources (manual responses are spatial in nature, while vocal ones are verbal).
3. Processing codes. Human controllers can rely on two working memory codes, namely a
spatial and a verbal one. Each is used to process or retain qualitatively different kinds of
information (spatial and visual vs temporal, verbal and phonetic) and each can be
disrupted by different concurrent activities. Resources underlying spatial processing and
left-hand control reside predominantly in the right hemisphere of the brain. Resources
underlying verbal processing, speech-responses and right-hand control reside more in the
left hemisphere.
A note should be made about the modality dimension. In Ref. [29] it is pointed out that
the resources metaphor does not readily apply to input modality. Instead, preemption and
attention-switching seem to dominate cross-modal time-sharing. However, these effects are
relatively small in comparison to the effort required for the extra scanning activity that is
generally involved with intramodal time-sharing.
Figure 1 is a representation of the multiple resources theory. Although the theory does not
pretend to account for all influences on multiple-task performance and time-sharing, research
showed that the identified dimensions account for a reasonably large proportion of these
influences and can be used in predicting task interference. Ideally, the loads on the
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dimensions must be established a priori. Input modalities are easy to define, as are vocal and
manual output modes. Information processing stages and processing codes will cause more
problems. Sometimes task analysis can reveal memory requirements.
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Figure 1: Proposed structure of resource dimensions (free after Wickens [24]).
We can now model the operator’s ability of time-sharing by evaluating which resources
are used during the simultaneous execution of the tasks. Heavy concurrent demands upon the
same resource then reduce time-sharing, whereas tasks using different resources can be time-
shared easily. However, the Wickens model does not further describe this.
B.  Contextual Control Mode Model
A major trend in human performance modeling is the Cognitive Viewpoint, [21]. Within
this approach, human behavior is looked upon as a cyclic process, where human action is
determined as much by the context as by inherent traits and mechanisms of human cognition.
In this view humans do not passively react to events, they actively look for information and
act based on intentions as well as external developments.
This approach in human performance modeling is in accordance with concepts from
ecological psychology. Ecological psychology studies the information transaction between
living systems and their environments, especially as they pertain to the perceived significance
of environmental situations for the planning and execution of purposive behavior [30].
Based on the cognitive viewpoint, as stated above, Hollnagel [21] describes a new
approach that focuses on different control modes of the human operator’s cognition, which
reflect different control strategies in operator behavior.
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1.  Control Modes
The specific four control modes that are described by Hollnagel [21] characterize in more
detail regions of the continuum of control and can be specified as follows:
1. Scrambled. Scrambled control denotes the case where the choice of the next action is
completely unpredictable or random. The scrambled control mode constitutes the extreme
situation of zero control.
2. Opportunistic. Opportunistic control corresponds to the case in which the next action is
chosen from the current context alone, and mainly based on salient features rather than on
more durable intentions or goals. It is opportunistic in the sense that the operator takes a
chance, not because he is deliberately exploring an alternative, but because there is no
time or possibility to do anything better.
3. Tactical. Tactical control is characteristic for situations in which the operator’s
performance is based on some kind of planning. Hence, the operator more or less follows
a known procedure or rule. The planning is limited of scope and/or limited in range, and
the needs taken into account may sometimes be ad hoc.
4. Strategic. Strategic control means that the operator is considering the global context, i.e.,
using a wider event horizon and looking ahead at higher level goals: either those that have
been suspended and have to be resumed or those that, according to experience and
expectations, may appear in the near future. This mode should provide a more efficient
and robust performance.
An obvious question that arises is what determines the degree of control an operator has
of a situation in a particular control mode and how the control mode changes. These topics
are discussed next.
2.  Control Mode Characteristics
In the Hollnagel approach, the control mode model consists of a high-level description of
human behavior, rather than a description of human tasks like planning, monitoring and
decision making. To stress the high-level character of these activities, they will be called
meta-activities. Following Ref. [21], the following four meta-activities are briefly elaborated
on:
1. number of simultaneous goals,
2. availability of plans,
3. event horizon, and
4. mode of execution.
1. Number of simultaneous goals. This variable describes whether the operator considers
only a single goal at a time or whether possible actions from multiple goals are
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considered. It is not the same as considering multiple choices or actions that may lead to
the same goal (i.e., evaluating the effects of several possible lines of action, such as
different ways of avoiding a conflict).
2. Availability of plans. This variable describes whether the operator can refer to predefined
or preexisting plans (action templates) as a basis for choosing the next action. A plan can
either be made on the spot, have been learned by experience, or have been defined
explicitly in advance, e.g., as a written procedure. In either case, the availability of plans
requires that the situation is familiar. A plan can either be followed rigidly or serve as a
guideline for actions to be taken.
3. Event horizon. This variable refers to how much of the past and how much of the future
are taken into consideration when a choice of action is being made. The event horizon is
described in terms of the number of steps, moves, or items that are considered, rather than
in subjective or objective time. The extent of the past is referred to as the history size,
while the extent of the future is referred to as the prediction length.
4. Mode of execution. The mode of execution can vary from feedforward to feedback driven.
In the feedforward driven execution the operator carries out the steps of a chosen plan
until either a predefined checkpoint has been reached or until external conditions force an
interrupt. The better a feedforward is, the longer the uninterrupted period may continue.
In the feedback driven execution, each step (or group of steps) is followed by the
evaluation of the feedback before the plan is continued. Even with a feedback mode of
execution there may be sets of actions that are carried out in a feedforward way. Thus
feedforward and feedback modes of execution define two ends of a continuum of
possibilities.
3.  Control Mode Changes
It is reasonable to assume that several factors will determine how and when an operator’s
control mode changes from one to another. Two of the obvious candidates that are described
by Hollnagel are the amount of subjectively available time and the outcome of the previous
action in terms of success and failure. These two main control parameters are briefly
elaborated on:
1. Subjectively available time. This involves a consideration of the number of activities that
remains to be carried out, e.g., suspended actions, the number of simultaneous goals, the
predicted changes and developments in the process and the environment (hence
“objective” time), the level of arousal, the level of familiarity of the situation, etc.. The
estimation ranges from being quite detailed and precise to guessing and “gut feeling”.
2. Determination of outcome (of previous actions). This is not just a matter of ascertaining
whether the previous action succeeded or failed. On the contrary, the determination of the
outcome is different for each control mode and may vary between a rudimentary
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detection of noticeable changes in the scrambled mode to a detailed evaluation of the
feedback in the strategic mode. Complicating factors are, for example, the possible delays
in outcome (for systems with large time constants), ambiguous or incomplete state
indications, and equivocal rules for interpretation.
C.  Human Error Modeling
The main reference used here is Ref. [31]. For safety-critical operations like nuclear
power plants, an attempt has been made to take into account the human factor in probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) approaches. In general a PRA starts with an identification of hazards
that might compromise the plant's safety. Next, the propagation of the possible consequences
of the identified hazards through the plant to the level of accidents is described. Frequently,
this is done by means of fault and event trees. After quantification of the frequency of
occurrence of the identified hazards, plant accident risks are evaluated using the fault and/or
event trees. Human error modeling approaches consist of two main elements: human error
identification (HEI) and human error probability (HEP) assessment. The results of these then
fit within the fault/event tree analysis framework.
1.  Human Error Identification
At the basis of human reliability modeling lies the (structured) identification of human
operator related hazards. Generally, this involves a task analysis and a human error analysis.
During the task analysis, the required operator actions during the various (sub-) processes of
the plant are identified. In this stage, the equipment, interfaces, procedures and (trained) skills
that are related to these actions are also identified.
After the task analysis, the HEI considers systematically what can go wrong. Commonly,
the following types of errors are considered:
1. Error of omission. Failing to carry out a required action.
2. Error of commission. Failing to carry out a required act adequately: insufficient accuracy,
wrong timing, actions performed in a wrong sequence.
3. Extraneous action. Unrequired act performed instead of, or in addition to, required act.
4. Error-recovery opportunities. Actions which can recover previous errors.
Underlying the HEI is a taxonomy of human error. As an example of a taxonomy of
human error, we describe the framework of skill-, rule- and knowledge-based behavior, [32],
in the next subsection.
2.  Skill-, Rule-, Knowledge-Based Taxonomy
In Ref. [33] human error is related to cognitive processes that underlie human
performance. Here, the human operator is looked upon as an information processor. The
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human information processor receives stimuli from the outside world, then processes these
stimuli and finally responds. In this framework, human error emerges when during this
scheme a deviation from normal processing routine occurs. One of the more influential
models of human (erroneous) performance is the Step Ladder model of Rasmussen [32]. This
model distinguishes three levels of human information processing: skill-based level, rule-
based level, and knowledge-based level. These levels induce the following taxonomy of
human errors:
1. Slips and lapses. Slips and lapses are unintended deviations from planned actions due to
execution or memory failures.
2. Rule-based errors. These are errors resulting from erroneous intentions due to the
application of bad rules or due to the misapplication of good rules.
3. Knowledge-based errors. These are errors due to wrong reasoning about the to-be-
controlled process. These mistakes may emerge from wrong or incomplete knowledge of
the process or the bounded rationality of the operator.
3.  Human Error Probability Assessment
The second step in human error modeling is to quantify the probability of occurrence of
the identified errors, for which many methods exist. The classical example is the human as a
technical system approach of the technique for human error rate prediction (THERP) (see
Ref. [34]). Other examples are success likelihood index methodology (SLIM) [35], which
relies mainly on expert judgement or human error assessment and reduction technique
(HEART) [36], which focuses on the effects of identified error-producing conditions.
III. Modeling for En Route ATC
The three psychological models of Section II are now used to develop a single
mathematical model of a tactical en route air traffic controller (ATCo) performing his job at a
high (cognitive) level. Detail is given only when necessary. The model focuses on the
following aspects of the interaction between the controller and the ATM process:
1. maintaining situational awareness,
2. timely taking of safety critical actions,
3. effectiveness of safety critical actions, and
4. occurrence of hazardous situations that involve the controller.
This section is organised as follows. First, the tactical controller task is described in terms
of a suitable set of subtasks. Subsequently, the performance of the identified subtasks is
related to the context in which the tasks are performed. Next, the scheduling of subtask
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performance is discussed, and it is explained how clearance errors that are initiated by the
controller are incorporated. Finally, the resulting mathematical model is described.
A.  Description of Controller Task
The idea is to decompose the controller's task into several subtasks. This decomposition
has been carried out along two dimensions. First a generic dimension, where the task is
decomposed into cognitive activities at a general level which is independent from the
scenario and operational concept. Second, the task is decomposed according to a
scenario/concept specific dimension, in which the controller task is described at the level of
operational functions in the scenario. This twofold decomposition of the controller task
allows flexibility in incorporating detail into the model: in this setup we can restrict detail in
the task description along the scenario/concept specific dimension to subtasks relevant for the
problem under consideration, while the overall interaction between controller and ATM
process may still be properly modeled  using the task description at the generic dimension.
First, a task decomposition along the generic dimension has been identified from Ref.
[15]. The resulting subtasks originate in Ref. [37], however, in Ref. [15] it was merged with
several existing task-analyses [38], [39], [40], [41]. The following subtasks resulted:
1. Sensing, to gather all information that is needed to get an overview over the air traffic
situation.
2. Integration, to connect the gathered information, thus forming a more global air traffic
picture.
3. Prediction, to use the more global picture to anticipate future situations and events.
4. Complementary communication, to pass the information to the aircraft to improve the
pilot’s understanding of the situation.
5. ATC problem solving planning, to use the understanding gained from the more global
perspective to plan and prioritise aircraft actions.
6. Executive action, to communicate information and priorities as instructions to the aircraft
in the system.
7. Rule monitoring, to ensure that the active components of the system behave in accordance
with the rules; monitoring and taking corrective actions for exceptions.
8. Coordination, to coordinate laterally with other parts of the ATC organization.
9. Overall performance, to ensure that the objectives of the operation are achieved, and that
the infrastructure functions correctly.
10. Maintenance and monitoring of nonhuman part, to ensure that all systems supporting the
controller work correctly.
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Second, subtasks are also defined along the en route ATC specific dimensions, where
attention is focused on safety-critical actions in the definition of the subtasks. This leads to
the identification of three en route context specific tasks:
A. anticipate for aircraft deviating from intentions,
B. react to automation alerts, and
C. perform other control activities.
We are now in the following position: the ATCo's task has been decomposed into
subtasks along two dimensions, one relating the task to generic cognitive activities and the
other dimension relating the task to specific situations in the scenario and operational concept
considered. We next identified the task overlap across the dimensions in Table 1. This leads
to 19 combinations across the dimensions, and thus a decomposition into 19 combined ATCo
subtasks.
Table 1: Task overlap across the generic cognitive activities and the en route ATC specific tasks.
A. Anticipate B. Alerts C. Others
1. Sensing X X
2. Integration X X
3. Prediction X X
4. Complementary communication X
5. Problem solving /planning X X X
6. Executive action X X X
7. Rule monitoring X X X
8. Coordination X
9. Overall performance X
10. Maintenance X
B.  Task Performance and Control Modes
In modeling the influence of the context on performance, we adopt a mathematical model
that incorporates two control modes: tactical control and opportunistic control. We identify
the characteristic influence of these control modes on the performance of the A and B
subtasks.
Because we may look upon subtask C as representing a range of subtasks other than A
and B along the en route ATC specific dimension, it suffices to describe differences in
tactical and opportunistic control mode at a general level only (see Ref. [17]). First, we
characterize subtasks related to anticipation:
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A1. Sensing:
Tactical: Whenever possible, the controller scans his display to detect possible deviations
from ATC intentions. The controller divides the display into regions of interest and assesses
these regions in a particular order. If scanning is interrupted at some time instant, the
controller will resume scanning starting at the region that he was scanning when the
interruption took place. Further information may also be obtained through radio/telephony
(R/T) communication.
Opportunistic: Whenever possible, the controller scans his display to detect possible
deviations. The controller scans in a random fashion.
A2. Integration:
Tactical: The ATCo systematically integrates the information derived from scanning to
improve his mental picture of the traffic situation. When some relevant information is not
available, the ATCo may return to sensing to actively seek information to improve his
assessment of the situation.
Opportunistic: The ATCo integrates the randomly obtained information. An incomplete
or even distorted mental picture may develop.
A3. Prediction:
Tactical: The ATCo extrapolates his mental picture to the future traffic situation. On the
basis of the assessment of the situation, the ATCo decides whether a problem may occur in
the midterm future.
Opportunistic: The assessment of the future situation is restricted to a short time horizon
and is based on incomplete information. It is assessed whether a problem may be expected in
the short-term future.
A5. Problem solving/planning:
Tactical: On the basis of the assessment of the (future) situation, the ATCo decides a
resolution to the expected problem. In principle, the resolution involves replanning the
aircraft trajectories in an optimal fashion with respect to safety and efficiency.
Opportunistic: The resolution is aimed at solving the imminent problem only.
A6. Executive action:
Tactical: The controller gives a series of R/T instructions to the aircraft involved. He
verifies whether the pilot(s) read back these instructions correctly.
Opportunistic: The verification of correct read back may be omitted.
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A7. Rule monitoring:
Tactical: After the R/T communication, the controller verifies whether or not the aircraft
comply with his clearances.
Opportunistic: This may be omitted or be performed less thoroughly.
Next, we characterize subtasks related to alerts:
B5. Problem solving/planning:
Tactical: On the basis of the assessment of the situation, the ATCo decides a resolution
for the conflict. The resolution may range from vectoring both aircraft to doing nothing.
Opportunistic: Same as in tactical control mode
B6. Executive action:
Tactical: The controller gives the necessary R/T instructions to the aircraft involved. He
verifies whether or not the pilots read back these instructions correctly.
Opportunistic: The verification of correct read back may be omitted.
B7. Rule monitoring:
Tactical: After the R/T communication, the controller verifies whether or not the aircraft
comply with his clearance.
Opportunistic: Monitoring may be done less thoroughly or even be omitted.
C.  Scheduling of Subtasks
In this subsection, the scheduling strategy applied will be defined for the subtasks. The
scheduling strategy is expressed in the following (input) task parameters:
1. Preemption. For each subtask an assumption is made whether or not it may preempt
another subtask.
2. Concurrency. For each subtask it is known whether it may be performed concurrently
with another subtask.
3. Initiation. For each subtask the circumstances under which the subtask should be
performed are known.
The assumptions concerning preemption and concurrency are implemented according to
Tables 2 and 3. These tables have been identified on the basis of ATC human factors expert
knowledge.
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Table 2a: Concurrent performance of subtasks (A1-C10)× (A1-B7).
A1 A2 A3 A5 A6 A7 B5 B6 B7
A1 - y y y n y n n y
A2 y - y y n y n n y
A3 y y - y n y n n y
A5 y y y - n y y n y
A6 n n n n - n n n n
A7 y y y y n - n n y
B5 n n n y n n - n n
B6 n n n n n n n - n
B7 y y y y n y n n -
C1 y y y y n y n n y
C2 y y y y n y n n y
C3 y y y y n y n n y
C4 y y n n n y n n y
C5 y y y y n y y n y
C6 y y n n n y n n n
C7 y y y y n y n n y
C8 y y n n n y n n y
C9 y y y y n y n n y
C10 y y y y n y n n y
Table 2b: Concurrent performance of subtasks (A1-C10)× (C1-C10).
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
A1 y y y y y y y y y y
A2 y y y y y y y y y y
A3 y y y n y n y n y y
A5 y y y n y n y n y y
A6 n n n n n n n n n n
A7 y y y y y y y y y y
B5 n n n n y n n n n n
B6 n n n n n n n n n n
B7 y y y y y n y y y y
C1 - y y y y y y y y y
C2 y - y y y y y y y y
C3 y y - n y n y n y y
C4 y y n - n n y n y y
C5 y y y n - n y n y y
C6 y y n n n - y n y y
C7 y y y y y y - y y y
C8 y y n n n n y - y y
C9 y y y y y y y y - y
C10 y y y y y y y y y -
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Table 3a: Preemption between subtasks (A1-C10)× (A1-B7).
A1 A2 A3 A5 A6 A7 B5 B6 B7
A1 - n n n n n n n n
A2 n - n n n n n n n
A3 n n - n n n n n n
A5 A5 A5 A5 - n A5 n n A5
A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 - A6 n n A6
A7 n n n n n - n n n
B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 n B5 - n B5
B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 - B6
B7 n n n n n n n n -
C1 n n n n n n n n n
C2 n n n n n n n n n
C3 n n n n n n n n n
C4 C4 C4 C4 n n n n n n
C5 n n n n n n n n n
C6 C6 C6 C6 n n C6 n n C6
C7 n n n n n n n n n
C8 C8 C8 C8 n n n n n n
C9 n n n n n n n n n
C10 n n n n n n n n n
Table 3b: Preemption between subtasks (A1-C10)× (C1-C10).
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
A1 n n n n n n n n n n
A2 n n n n n n n n n n
A3 n n n n n n n n n n
A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5
A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6
A7 n n n n n n n n n n
B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5
B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6
B7 n n n n n n n n n n
C1 - n n n n n n n n n
C2 n - n n n n n n n n
C3 n n - n n n n n n n
C4 C4 C4 C4 - C4 n C4 n C4 C4
C5 C5 C5 C5 n - n C5 n C5 C5
C6 C6 C6 C6 C6 C6 - C6 C6 C6 C6
C7 n n n n n n - n n n
C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 n C8 - C8 C8
C9 n n n n n n n n - n
C10 n n n n n n n n n -
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Tables 2 and 3 should be read as follows. Consider subtasks C4 (general communication)
and A3 (prediction with respect to deviations). It follows from Table 2 that these two
subtasks cannot be performed concurrently. Next, inspect the row C4 in Table 3 at the
column corresponding to A3, we see that C4 preempts A3. Thus if A3 is carried out and C4 is
initiated, execution of A3 will stop and C4 will be performed first. If concurrent performance
were possible (i.e., there would be a “y” in Table 2), then preemption would mean that C4
and A3 are performed concurrently, with C4 as the primary and A3 as the secondary task. In
terms of a stack of to-be-performed subtasks, this scheduling principle can be formulated
generically as the following two rules:
Rule 1: An initiated subtask will be placed in the stack before the subtasks that it may
preempt.
Rule 2: If the first two subtasks of the stack can be processed concurrently, this will be
done (subtask duration will be slightly longer, however).
D.  Errors in Flight Plans and Intents
An important safety issue is that for one single aircraft there may be all kinds of
differences between the flight intents on the ground and in the air, and the ATCo and pilot
awareness of those intents, i.e.:
1. tactical ATCo’s awareness of the flight intent,
2. flightplan in the ATC system,
3. pilot’s awareness of the flight intent, and
4. flightplan used by the flight management system (FMS).
To allow for these differences, the following mathematical modeling approach is adopted:
1. ATCo. The tactical ATCo’s awareness of the flight intent is assumed to be ATC’s true
reference. The quality of ATC’s true reference is in one of the following two discrete
modes: a) the true reference provides separation, b) the true reference does not provide
separation. In general, the latter mode value may be reached if an ATCo has made a
knowledge-based error.
2. ATC. The quality of the flightplan in the ATC system may be in one of the following two
discrete modes: a) agrees with ATC’s true reference, b) differs from ATC’s true
reference. The latter is due to an ATCo input error, or an ATC database error.
3. Pilot. The quality of the pilot’s awareness of ATC’s true reference is in one of the
following two discrete modes: a) agrees with ATC’s true reference, b) differs from ATC’s
true reference. The latter may happen due to a clearance error. There are two types of
clearance errors: 1) intended clearance given to wrong aircraft or 2) wrong clearance
given to intended aircraft. The causing factor may be with the ATCo, or the pilot, or both,
and may be knowledge based, rule based or skill based.
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4. FMS. The quality of the flightplan used in the FMS is in one of the following two discrete
modes: a) agrees with ATC’s true reference, b) differs from ATC’s true reference. The
latter happens if pilot awareness differs from ATC’s true reference or is due to a pilot
input error or an FMS database error.
In elaborating the above, it is assumed that all the ATCo related errors may occur at
random during performance of subtasks A6, B6 or C6, (executive action), where the
frequency of occurrence depends on the control mode the controller is in. Furthermore, such
errors may be detected and corrected during rule monitoring subtasks A7, B7, or C7, also
depending on the control mode (e.g., Ref. [20]).
E.  Mathematical Model of Tactical ATCo
To establish the connections with the other ATM processes, in this subsection we
describe the mathematical model of the ATCo from an input-output point of view. First we
describe how initiation of cognitive activity is modeled, and then the implementation of the
task description and controller performance is described. The Petri net of the tactical ATCo
model is shown in Fig. 2.
1. Initiation
Three stimuli for ATCo cognitive activity are identified: ATCo’s anticipation, automation
alerts, and other actions. Activity triggering situations that first have to be detected by the
operator (like an aircraft severely deviating from its route) are not considered as an initiation
stimulus, because general sensing is modeled as a part of the operator’s task, and therefore
the sensing activity has to be initiated first. For the occurrence of certain stimuli, various
other ATM modules may need to function properly, such as the ATCo human machine
interface (HMI) and surveillance for an automation alert.
Within the Petri net each stimulus is modeled as a place, connected with one transition
that fires if initiation of the corresponding cognitive activity takes place. These transitions
produce two tokens: one token returning to the stimulus place for future generation of
cognitive activity and one token in a stack place. The stack places represent the situation that
the respective initiated cognitive activity has to wait until the operator has completed other
(more important) tasks. The places Anticipation, Alert, and Other action represent initiation
of cognitive activity by own initiative, automation alerts and other action (e.g., a pilot
request) respectively. Preconditions on occurrence of these stimuli are modeled  within the
respective transitions: if the preconditions are not met, the transition does not fire. For
example, the proper functioning of the ATCo HMI as a precondition for the occurrence of an
automation alert triggering ATCo cognitive activity is modeled  as a precondition for firing of
the transition connected to the Alert place.
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Figure 2: Petri net of tactical ATCo model.
2. ATCo Subtasks
The ATCo task has been divided into several subtasks which are each defined as the
combination of a scenario-specific purpose and a generically described cognitive activity.
Three context-specific purposes are modeled: ATCo to detect and correct deviations of
aircraft from ATCo intentions, ATCo to react to automation alerts (initiated by automation
tools), and ATCo to perform other control activities (initiated by own initiative or through
other actions). Each subtask is represented by a place in the Petri net, which is named after
the cognitive activity it represents. The tokens then model cognitive activity on the subtask
that corresponds to the place in which they reside. Some cognitive activities may be
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performed for several purposes, leading to several places with the same name. In the
following we describe the places with respect to the cognitive activities that they represent.
The places named sensing represent the situation in which the ATCo is gathering
information to improve his picture of the traffic situation. The places named integration
represent the situation in which the ATCo incorporates the newly obtained information into
this mental picture. The place communication represents the situation in which the ATCo
makes his knowledge of the situation available to the pilots. The place over-all performance
describes the evaluation of sector performance as a whole. In the prediction place, the ATCo
extrapolates his picture of the traffic to the future, whereas in the problem solving/planning
place he synthesizes solutions to possible (future) problems. In the executive action place, the
operator gives clearances to aircraft, followed by the monitoring places where it is verified
whether the aircraft adhere to these clearances. In the out place, the tokens are collected after
performance.
Whenever one subtask is logically performed after performing another (e.g., prediction is
performed after integration), and they have the same scenario-specific purpose, a transition is
drawn between those two subtasks.
3. Subtask Scheduling
We next incorporate the scheduling rules. Scheduling depends on the relative priority of a
subtask and the possible concurrent performance of two subtasks. The relative priority is
modeled  as a color type that is associated with the tokens that represent cognitive activity on
subtasks. This color type is a number 1,2,… where low numbers correspond to high priority.
The priority colors are updated whenever a new token is initiated and when a token is
collected in the out place, according to a suitable set of assumptions. According to the
scheduling rules, either the token that has priority 1 is performed exclusively or the tokens
with priority 1 and 2 are performed concurrently, with the token with priority 2 being the
secondary task.
We assume that for each subtask the time needed to complete it has a certain probability
density, given the current control mode of the ATCo and possible concurrent performance of
another subtask. In the Petri net, the duration of performing a subtask is modeled  as a delay
in the firing of the transition that has the subtask as input place. Transitions with a token in
the input place that does not have priority 1 or 2 have “infinite” delays. Transitions with a
token in the input place that has priority 1 has a delay corresponding to the normal duration
of the subtask, given the control mode. Delays of transitions with a token in the input place
that has priority 2 either have an infinite delay or a delay that may be longer than when the
corresponding subtask is performed exclusively. This depends on the extent to which the
subtasks with priority 1 and 2 may be performed concurrently. Hence in the Petri net, each
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transition has a delay that is a function of the priority of the token in the input place, the
current control mode, and the place in which the token with priority 1 resides.
The ATCo's executive actions (i.e., the clearances given) are also modeled  as a color
type associated with the tokens in the subtasks. This color type is a set of paired numbers
describing the type of clearance given and the aircraft to which the clearance is given. The
decision to give no clearance at all is also modeled  as an executive action and has a separate
color value. In the present model, it is assumed that the type of clearance given is determined
during the executive action subtask only and that it depends on the control mode only. Thus
the firing of the transitions after the executive action places also affects the Petri nets of other
ATM modules: completion of executive action means that a decision to give a clearance to an
aircraft has been carried out and therefore the firing of these transitions describes the ATCo
control actions.
4. ATCo Control Modes
In the model, ATCo performance depends on the control mode, scheduling rules, and
results in a clearance. In the DCPN model of the ATCo, two control modes are identified,
which are each represented by a place in the Petri Net: the place Tactical models the situation
in which the controller has a relatively high degree of control and the place Opportunistic
models a relatively low degree of control. The control mode may influence ATCo
performance in all aspects. The switching between control modes is modeled  by transitions
between the Tactical and Opportunistic places. The resulting subnet contains one token, the
place of which defines the current degree of control. The firing of the transitions between the
control modes depends on the number of tokens in the stack places (indicating the
subjectively available time) and the number of times that monitoring was followed by another
executive action during the last few minutes (indicating the outcome of previous actions
measured as the number of clearances that the controller considers to be insufficiently
effective). Details for this type of modeling appeared to be available through human factors
ATC expert knowledge.
IV. Reduction of the ATCo Model
In this section, we explain how the ATCo model that was developed in Section III is
reduced by applying appropriate model aggregations. The motivation for this reduction is that
the complexity of the original model results from a detailed modeling that is judged
unnecessary for the application at hand. This makes the resulting reduced model interesting in
its own right.
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First, we explain how the subtasks are clustered into a new set of subtasks, and how
scheduling simplifies accordingly. Second, the Petri net for the ATCo reduced model is
given. Third, within an en route context we compare the relevant model characteristics to
verify that the model based on the reduced task description is indeed an appropriate
approximation.
A.  Aggregation of Subtasks
In the previous section, Tables 2 and 3 show that, due to the possibility of concurrent
performance of subtasks, the number of required assumptions concerning concurrent subtask
performance equals ½ n(n-1) and the number of required assumptions concerning preemption
equals n(n-1), with n the number of identified subtasks. For the present 19 subtasks, this
means a total of 342 rules concerning task scheduling in the model. This large number of
rules may severely complicate the stochastic analysis that is required for risk evaluation.
Therefore, it is desirable to reduce the complexity of the model without compromising
conservativeness or psychological validity.
This reduction of the full model is achieved by decreasing the level of detail at which the
air traffic control task is described and the way performance of these tasks is scheduled
according to single-task performance.
The approach taken is to group the 19 subtasks into a smaller number of clusters of
subtasks. The clusters are identified in Table 4.
Table 4: Clustering of the subtasks.
Cluster Initial subtasks
MonitoringA A1-A3
CommunicationA A5-A7
CommunicationB B5-B7
Complementary CommunicationC C4
CommunicationC C6
Co-ordinationC C8
MiscellaneousC C1-C3, C5, C7, C9, C10
Next, we need to identify how task scheduling at the level of clusters of subtasks takes
place. First, concurrent performance of clusters of subtasks is investigated using Table 2. This
is done conservatively using the principle that if one combination of the clustered subtasks
cannot be performed concurrently, then the whole clusters of subtasks cannot be performed
concurrently. Application of this principle yields Table 5.
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Table 5: Concurrent performance of clusters of subtasks, derived from Tables 2 and 4.
MonA ComA ComB CpCC ComC CoorC MiscC
MonA - n n n n n y
ComA n - n n n n n
ComB n n - n n n n
CpCC n n n - n n n
ComC n n n n - n n
CoorC n n n n n - n
MiscC y n n n n n -
In a similar fashion, we identify a new table (Table 6) for the preemption between
clusters of subtasks. The following rule is applied: if any subtask in some cluster A preempts
all subtasks in some other cluster B, then cluster A preempts cluster B. Otherwise, cluster A
does not preempt cluster B.
Table 6: Preemption between clusters of subtasks, derived from Tables 3 and 4.
MonA ComA ComB CpCC ComC CoorC MiscC
MonA - n n n n n n
ComA ComA - n ComA ComA ComA ComA
ComB ComB ComB - ComB ComB ComB ComB
CpCC CpCC n n - n n CpCC
ComC ComC n n ComC - ComC ComC
CoorC CoorC n n CoorC n - CoorC
MiscC n n n n n n -
Table 6 implies that the cluster MiscC does not preempt any other cluster. Moreover,
MiscC is preempted by all other clusters, except MonitoringA. Furthermore, it follows from
Table 2 that MonitoringA and MiscC can be performed concurrently. From this, we conclude
that performance of the subtasks in the cluster MiscC does not conflict with other subtasks at
cluster level. Because the cluster MiscC itself does not contain subtasks that are directly
relevant for safe separation, we can therefore discard this cluster in the model without
compromising conservativeness. Therefore, we do not take into account this cluster in the
sequel.
Now inspect Tables 5 and 6 again. Perhaps surprisingly, we see that concurrent
performance of the remaining clusters of subtasks is not possible. Moreover, the remaining
preemption rules boil down to a fixed priority list where MonitoringA has lowest and
CommunicationB has highest priority. Apparently, similar principles underlie Tables 2 and 3,
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although the construction of these tables was done before and independently from the subtask
clustering analysis.
We conclude that at the level of clustered tasks, the complexity of the scheduling
principle is reduced significantly, without compromising conservativeness. In summary, the
main model simplifications are
1. 19 subtasks are reduced to 6 clusters of subtasks,
2. concurrent task performance is simplified into single task performance, and
3. preemption rules for each combination of subtasks are simplified into a fixed priority list.
B.  Reduced ATCo Model
On the basis of the aggregation, a reduced model of the ATCo can now be developed. Six
main ATCo cognitive tasks are identified, which describe the operator performance at a
cognitive level. For each task, we assumed a relative priority ranking, an average duration
and the percentage of his time that the operator would spend on the task if uninterrupted
(Table 7).
Table 7: Six main cognitive tasks.
Task Priority Description
MonitoringA 6 Visual anticipation and detection of deviations from the ATCo
intention
CommunicationA 2 Communicate clearance with an aircraft that deviated severely
visually from ATCo intention
CommunicationB 1 Communicate clearance with aircraft for which an automation alert
was issued
Complementary
communicationC
5 General complementary communication with pilots
CommunicationC 3 General communication of executive action (i.e., clearances)
Co-oordinationC 4 General coordination with planner controller, controllers of other
sectors.
The ATCo performs these tasks one at a time, according to the given priorities. Task
scheduling is kept straightforward: high priority tasks are performed first, possibly
preempting a low priority task. Two important aspects of performance are incorporated as
well: the influence of the control mode and the possibility of erroneous clearances. The Petri
net describing the discrete modes for the ATCo model is given in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3: Petri Net of reduced ATCo model.
Two control modes are considered, Tactical and Opportunistic, which reflect the degree
of control. In the Tactical mode, the ATCo takes his time and makes little errors. In the
Opportunistic mode, the general tasks (marked subscript C) are performed faster, but the
chances on errors are also larger. The switching between the control modes depends on the
subjectively available time (measured as the number of tasks waiting to be performed) and
the outcome of previous actions (measured as the number of corrective actions, i.e.,
CommunicationA and CommunicationB, taken by the ATCo during the last two min). If the
subjectively available time is short or if the outcome of previous actions is bad, then the
ATCo switches to Opportunistic control mode.
ATCo erroneous clearances are taken into account as follows: the ATCo may give a
different clearance than he intended to (e.g., switching heading and speed), or he may give
the clearance to a different aircraft than he intended to (call-signs mixed up). These errors are
incorporated as random variations in the ATCo actions. The error types are represented as a
color value of the tokens in the place Clearances.
The switching between modes is affected by several other modules, such as aircraft
evolution, surveillance, ATC system, R/T local, R/T global, and performance of pilot.
Surveillance output (i.e., the estimated aircraft state) is input for the visual detection of severe
deviations by the ATCo. The ATC system must be Working for the ATCo to be able to do his
job. The R/T modules and pilot module together form the decision making loop or DM-loop.
If all modules in the DM-loop are Working, Relaxed, Delaying, or Busy for a given aircraft,
then the ATCo is able to give a clearance to that aircraft.
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C.  Comparison Against Statistical Data
Next we evaluated for the ATCo routine monitoring concept the period to detect severe
deviations such that a comparison with available statistical data is possible [42].
A full and reduced ATCo performance model was developed on the basis of the cognitive
principles identified in Section II and integrated with appropriate Petri net models for the
other relevant components in conventional ATC (see Fig. 4).
Figure 4: Functional representation of conventional ATC.
Comparison with the model-based results (Fig. 5) shows that the detection time results of
both the original and the reduced ATCo model agree quite well with the measured data. It
should be noticed that in Ref. [42] only very few detection times beyond 150 s were
measured. This is most probably due to the limited number of measurements made in
combination with the low probability of such long detection times. Although they have low
probability, the longer detection times add significantly to the risk, and Fig. 5 shows that
model-based results do extend to these low probability values. We may conclude that both
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the full and the reduced model curves agree quite well with the statistical data. This clearly
contributes to gaining confidence in the model-based approach taken.
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Figure 5: ATCo detection time of severe deviations of the full model (line marked ‘+’), of the reduced
model (line marked ‘o’) and of statistical data, Ref. [42], (dashed/dotted line, the dotted part
representing data based on less than 5 measurements).
In this section, we have shown how to derive a reduced model of the ATCo performance
from a more detailed ATCo model that was developed in Section III. This reduction is based
on using a less detailed decomposition of the air traffic control task and simplifying
concurrent task performance into single task performance (i.e., one task at a time). From Fig.
5 it appears that this reduced model yields slightly more conservative ATCo detection time
results. Therefore, we conclude that for the particular application considered here,
incorporation of concurrent task processing into the ATCo performance model is not
necessary for avoiding overly conservative risk estimates. Obviously, incorporation of
concurrent processing into human performance models may be essential for other
applications such as detailed workload assessment.
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S
V. Example Application
In this section we show TOPAZ-based assessment results for accident risk and ATCo
actions for an hypothetical ATM scenario that consists of two en route traffic streams, flying
in opposite directions, all at one single flight level.
A.  Hypothetical ATC Example
The rather hypothetical example has been developed by EUROCONTROL with the aim
to learn understanding how ATC influences accident risk, and how far the nominal separation
S between opposite RNP1 traffic streams can safely be reduced. The specific details of this
scenario are:
1. There is a straight route, with two traffic lanes.
2. ATCo expects all aircraft to stay on these lanes.
3. Parameter S denotes distance between the two lanes (see Fig. 6).
4. Opposite traffic flows along each lane.
5. Aircraft fly at one flight level only.
6. Traffic flow per lane is 3.6 aircraft/h.
7. All aircraft nominally satisfy required navigation performance with 95% of time less than
1 n mile derivation (RNP1).
8. None of the aircraft is equipped with a traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS).
9. Target level of safety (TLS) is 5 ×10-9 accidents/flight h (Ref. [43]).
10. 15 aircraft per sector/ATCo.
11. There are no military aircraft.
Figure 6: Opposite direction traffic in a dual lane structure.
This exemplar scenario is considered for the following three ATM concepts:
A. Procedural separation only. In this case, there is no ATC surveillance system. This is the
type of situation encountered with traffic over the North Atlantic.
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B. STCA-only based ATC. In this case there is a radar-based surveillance and R/T
communication, but it is assumed that ATC is doing nothing with this information unless
its STCA system issues an alert, thus assuming no monitoring by ATCo.
C. Routine monitoring based ATC. The same as in B, but now without the STCA system.
Thus, aircraft deviations are only identified through routine monitoring.
B.  Accident Risk
For each of the three ATM concepts, the TOPAZ accident risk assessment methodology
and tool set have been used to assess accident risk for the preceding scenario, as a function of
the spacing parameter S. The accident risk result for the newly developed model is presented
as the graph marked ‘ATCo routine monitoring’ in Fig. 7. In Fig. 7, there also is a horizontal
line that represents the target level of safety (TLS).
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Figure 7. Accident risk vs route spacing, the graphs marked ‘No ATC’ and ‘STCA-only based ATC’
have been taken from Ref. [8]. The graph ‘ATCo routine monitoring’ is from Ref. [17]. The TLS value
used is defined in Ref. [43].
1. Qualitative Uncertainty Analysis
Absolute usage of the risk curves without taking into consideration existing bias and/or
uncertainty can inspire undue conclusions. Because of model-based quantitative risk
assessment approach, it is possible to bring the model assumptions made to the foreground
and subsequently perform an uncertainty analysis of the model vs reality.
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With the TOPAZ methodology, the starting point for such uncertainty analysis consists of
the following:
1. description of nominal operation and procedures,
2. list of hazards identified for the operation considered,
3. list of assumptions made when building the Petri net,
4. Petri net specification (local and interactions), and
5. list of parameters and values used during the numerical evaluation, and their sources.
For the routine monitoring concept there are more than 200 hazards (about 50% is human
related), about 25 model assumptions, and about 100 model parameters (about 20% for the
reduced ATCo model).
The qualitative uncertainty analysis that can be performed works as follows. First, for
each hazard it is specified how it is incorporated in the Petri net or not (due to a model
assumption listed). The result is that for each parameter and for each assumption, the related
hazards are identified. The subsequent steps are:
1. per assumption, perform a qualitative assessment of its uncertainty impact on the risk;
2. per parameter value, perform a qualitative assessment of the uncertainty in relation to the
applicable hazards; and
3. per parameter value, assess the impact of this uncertainty impact on the risk.
At this moment, this qualitative uncertainty analysis has not yet been applied to the
preceding evaluated en route examples. However, it has successfully been applied in a Wake
vortex risk assessment study (see Ref. [13]). On the basis of this experience, we expect that
the main contribution to uncertainty will come from unmodeled  hazards (either due to model
assumptions or due to missing hazards), rather than from parameter value uncertainty. For the
curves in Fig. 7 this means that, for the time being, they should be interpreted in a relative
way only.
2. Analysis of Risk Curves
Inspection of Fig. 7 yields that the TLS is reached for a route spacing of about 24 km (13
n miles), which is a significant improvement of the values of the No ATC curve [TLS
reached at about 58 km (~32 n miles)] and the STCA-only based ATC curve [TLS reached at
about 40 km (~22 n miles)]. Obviously, for busy fixed-route situations over the continent,
procedural separation is not very helpful with STCA-only based ATC. The improvement
provided by the routine monitoring shows that it is much more effective in safely managing
deviations from centerline than reacting to STCA alerts only. Apparently, STCA really is a
safety net only.
We also observe that the risk reduction provided by monitoring based ATC increases as
route spacing increases. This is in contrast to the STCA-only based control strategy, in which
the ATCo prevents a fixed ratio of the deviating aircraft that reach the other route from
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collision. The reason for this increasing risk reduction is that the number of severe deviations
that are detected before the aircraft reaches the other route increases faster with route spacing
than the decrease in the number of deviating aircraft that reach the other route. Hence, the
slope of the risk figure depends on the slope of the ATCo detection time instead of the slope
of the non-nominal lateral deviation probability density function. Consequently, accident risk
may be further reduced by changing the ATM design and in particular the role of the
controller such that the ATCo detection time is improved.
3. Safety Criticality Analysis
Further evaluation showed that safety criticality lies with the Sharp turn type of
deviations. This is caused by the fact that during the Sharp turns the aircraft deviates from the
route much faster than in the case of a general Non-nominal deviation. For S = 24 km (13 n
miles) our evaluations showed that the risk involved with the Sharp turns to be a factor 15
higher than for the Non-nominal deviations.
In the present model, the Sharp turns are caused by erroneous ATCo clearances and
aircraft flightplan errors, whereas the Non-nominal deviations are caused by degraded
navigation systems, degraded aircraft systems etc. Hence, from the safety criticality result we
conclude that the most risky situations originate in the human factor rather than in degraded
performance of technical systems.
C.  ATCo Effort and Effect
The ATC effort is related to the number of ATC actions normalized by the theoretical
minimum of ATC actions required for averting all accidents (i.e., one action per accident that
would occur if there were no ATC). This is approximately equal to the number of ATC
actions required to avert one accident (as almost all potential accidents should be averted):
Effort: 


≈=
accidents Averted
actions ATC
ATC without Accidents,
actions ATC
aρ
Next, we express the ATC effect as the factor of accident risk reduction achieved by
ATC:
Effect: 
ATC  withAccidents,
ATC without Accidents,
=bρ   
Graphs for the metrics ρa and ρb for STCA-only based ATC and routine monitoring are
given in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8. Effort ρa and effect ρb for routine monitoring (+ graph) and STCA-only based ATC (o
graph).
From the ρb curves in Fig. 8, we conclude that the monitoring strategy yields a better risk
reduction for all spacings. Second, inspection of the ρa graphs yields that for small spacings,
monitoring requires even less effort than STCA-only based ATC. For larger spacings
monitoring requires more effort than STCA-only based ATC. We conclude that for small
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spacings, monitoring is to be preferred (more effect, less effort), whereas for larger spacings
the situation is less clear (more effect, but also more effort).
A remark should be made concerning spacings below 2 n miles (where the ρb has
negative values for monitoring). Notice that these very low spacings are not realistic for the
monitoring concept, since for these spacings aircraft may collide while remaining within the
safe boundary around the lanes (whence the ATCo does not take action to prevent these
collisions). We therefore disregarded these very small spacings.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper applied state-of-the-art psychology in human cognition/performance modeling
for application to accident risk modeling. This led to the development of mathematical human
cognition/performance models for a tactical ATCo in a conventional en route ATC situation.
This model is shown to be of great use in the evaluation of accident risks for an ATM
scenario with the tactical ATCo performing routine monitoring to detect and correct for
severely deviating aircraft.
In this work, we took a model-based approach toward the assessment of concepts such as
accident risk and controllability in ATM situations. This makes the approach a formal one:
for the model, accident risk and ATCo effort and effect indicators are unambiguously
defined. If numerical evaluations of the model are carried out in a verifiably correct way, then
the validity of the results depends on the verifiability of the model only.
The main problem thus is how to verify that the model “matches” reality sufficiently well
with respect to the intended use of the model. It should be stressed that an absolute match is
not feasible: however, this is also not necessary. Instead, a case that the model is sufficiently
realistic for its purposes should be built, by testing both the assumptions made during model
development and relevant characteristics of the eventual model. The confidence in the model
should then be based on the quality of the arguments for its validity (i.e., the test results).
This model validation approach is currently under development. On the basis of the human
cognition modeling and the controllability results in this report, we recognize a contribution
to this approach, which consists of comparing relevant model characteristics with human-in-
the-loop measurements in the case of human controllability evaluation. Such comparison
should always be treated with care, as the results may be sensitive to the context.
For the present model, three tests of its validity have been carried out. First, in Ref. [17]
the human performance modeling approaches that underlie the ATCo model used have been
shown to be sufficiently powerful to explain ATCo-related hazards in en route ATM. Second,
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in Fig. 5 ATCo detection time, which is a relevant model characteristic for accident risk was
compared against controller-in-the-loop based data from the literature. Third, during the
whole development of the ATCo model, a human factors specialist has been actively
involved, and the results have been reviewed by an operational expert. Obviously, further
confidence building can and should be done, e.g., on the basis of detailed reviews with a
number of experts and comparison of a range of model characteristics with additional
empirical data.
When designing advanced ATM, it is important to understand the safety issues already at
a conceptual level. Because of the extremely low probability of accidents in existing ATM
practice, statistical data from practical situations are limited and analyzing accident reports
alone is not sufficient to understand safety at the level of the interactions between the various
ATM components. For advanced ATM designs, data concerning unsafe events may even be
lacking. Therefore, some kind of modeling approach is required to optimize for capacity and
separation criteria without compromising safety.
Because in about 80% of the reported accidents humans were part of the cause, it is
imperative to properly incorporate the human factor into the models used for risk assessment.
In this report, we therefore investigated three complementary psychological models, and we
combined them into a single mathematical model of a tactical ATCo in a conventional en
route context.
Because monitoring activity is typically performed as an integrated part of the tactical
ATCo job, it is necessary to also take into account other ATCo activities that may interfere
with monitoring. This was accomplished through our contextual model of ATCo performance
that takes into account the interfering tasks at a cognitive level, thus minimizing the level of
modeling detail required to take into account the interfering tasks. We also showed that this
advanced ATCo performance model can be included in an accident risk model for the
conventional en route ATC situation considered, and that the time needed for the ATCo to
detect a severe deviation as predicted by the model agrees rather well with statistical data. We
also demonstrated that we could use the model to evaluate accident risk for the ATM
scenario, and that the results provide valuable insight and feedback to ATM designers.
We conclude that the use of advanced psychological models in accident risk modeling is
feasible, thus extending the applicability of the accident risk modeling approach to situations
in which isolated models of individual human actions do not suffice.
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